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use#LAATHE EXPERIMENT  AND HEW'S  ETHICAL  REVIEW 
Racism  and  Research:  The  Case  of 
the  Tuskegee  Syphilis  Study 
by ALLAN M. BRANDT 
In  1932 the U.S. Public  Health  Service  (USPHS)  initiated 
an experiment  in Macon  County,  Alabama,  to determine  the 
natural  course of untreated,  latent syphilis  in black males. 
The test comprised  400 syphilitic  men, as well as 200 unin- 
fected  men who served  as controls.  The first  published  report 
of the study  appeared  in 1936 with  subsequent  papers  issued 
every  four to six years, through  the 1960s. When  penicillin 
became  widely  available  by the early 1950s as the preferred 
treatment  for syphilis,  the men did not receive  therapy.  In 
fact on several  occasions,  the USPHS  actually  sought  to pre- 
vent treatment.  Moreover,  a committee  at the federally  op- 
erated  Center  for Disease Control  decided  in 1969 that the 
study  should  be continued.  Only in 1972, when accounts  of 
the study  first  appeared  in the national  press,  did the Depart- 
ment  of Health,  Education  and  Welfare  halt  the experiment. 
At that time seventy-four  of the test subjects  were  still alive; 
at least twenty-eight,  but perhaps  more than 100, had died 
directly  from advanced  syphilitic  lesions.1  In August 1972, 
HEW  appointed  an investigatory  panel  which  issued  a report 
the following  year. The panel found  the study  to have been 
"ethically  unjustified,"  and argued that penicillin should 
have been provided  to the men.2 
This article  attempts  to place  the Tuskegee  Study  in a his- 
torical  context  and to assess  its ethical  implications.  Despite 
the media  attention  which  the study  received,  the  HEW  Final 
Report, and the criticism  expressed  by several  professional 
organizations,  the experiment  has been largely misunder- 
stood.  The most  basic  questions  of how the study  was under- 
taken in the first  place and why it continued  for forty  years 
were  never  addressed  by the HEW investigation.  Moreover, 
the panel misconstrued  the nature  of the experiment,  failing 
to consult important  documents  available at the National 
Archives  which bear significantly  on its ethical assessment. 
Only by examining  the specific ways in which values are 
engaged  in scientific  research  can the study  be understood. 
Racism  and  Medical  Opinion 
A brief  review  of the prevailing  scientific  thought  regard- 
ing race  and  heredity  in the early  twentieth  century  is funda- 
mental  for an understanding  of the Tuskegee  Study.  By the 
turn of the century,  Darwinism  had provided  a new ration- 
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ale for American  racism.3  Essentially  primitive  peoples, it 
was argued,  could not be assimilated  into a complex,  white 
civilization.  Scientists  speculated  that in the struggle  for sur- 
vival the Negro in America  was doomed.  Particularly  prone 
to disease, vice, and crime, black Americans  could not be 
helped  by education  or philanthropy.  Social Darwinists  ana- 
lyzed census data to predict the virtual extinction of the 
Negro in the twentieth  century,  for they believed  the Negro 
race in America  was in the throes of a degenerative  evolu- 
tionary  process.4 
The medical profession  supported  these findings  of late 
nineteenth-  and  early  twentieth-century  anthropologists,  eth- 
nologists,  and biologists.  Physicians  studying  the effects of 
emancipation  on health concluded  almost universally  that 
freedom  had caused the mental, moral, and physical  dete- 
rioration  of the black population.5  They substantiated  this 
argument  by citing  examples  in the comparative  anatomy  of 
the black and white races. As Dr. W. T. English  wrote: "A 
careful  inspection  reveals  the body of the negro a mass of 
minor  defects  and  imperfections  from  the crown  of the head 
to the soles of the feet..  .."  Cranial structures, wide nasal 
apertures,  receding  chins, projecting  jaws, all typed the Ne- 
gro as the lowest species in the Darwinian  hierarchy.7 
Interest  in racial  differences  centered  on the sexual  nature 
of blacks.  The Negro,  doctors  explained,  possessed  an exces- 
sive sexual  desire,  which threatened  the very foundations  of 
white society.  As one physician  noted in the Journal  of the 
American Medical Association,  "The negro springs from a 
southern  race, and as such his sexual appetite  is strong;  all 
of his environments  stimulate  this appetite,  and as a general 
rule his emotional  type of religion certainly  does not de- 
crease it."8 Doctors reported a complete lack of morality on 
the part of blacks: 
Virtue in the negro race is like angels' visits-few  and far 
between.  In a practice  of sixteen  years  I have never examined 
a virgin negro over fourteen years of age.9 
A particularly  ominous  feature  of this overzealous  sexuality, 
doctors  argued,  was  the  black  males'  desire  for  white  women. 
"A perversion  from which most races are exempt,"  wrote 
Dr. English,  "prompts  the negro's  inclination  towards  white 
women,  whereas  other  races incline  towards  females  of their 
own."10  Though  English estimated  the "gray  matter  of the 
negro  brain"  to be at least a thousand  years behind  that of 
the white races,  his genital organs  were overdeveloped.  As 
Dr. William  Lee Howard  noted: 
The attacks on defenseless white women are evidences of 
racial instincts  that are about as amenable  to ethical culture 
as is the inherent  odor of the race ....  When education  will 
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21 reduce  the size of the negro's  penis as well as bring about  the 
sensitiveness  of the terminal  fibers  which exist in the Cauca- 
sian, then will it also be able to prevent  the African's  birth- 
right to sexual madness  and excess." 
One southern medical journal proposed "Castration Instead 
of Lynching," as retribution for black sexual  crimes. "An 
impressive trial by a ghost-like kuklux klan [sic] and a 'ghost' 
physician or surgeon to perform the operation would make 
it an event the 'patient' would never forget," noted the edi- 
torial.12 
According to these physicians, lust and immorality, un- 
stable families, and reversion to  barbaric tendencies made 
blacks especially prone to venereal diseases. One doctor esti- 
mated that over 50  percent of  all Negroes over the age of 
twenty-five  were  syphilitic.13 Virtually  free  of  disease  as 
slaves, they were now  overwhelmed by it, according to in- 
formed medical opinion.  Moreover,  doctors believed  that 
treatment for venereal disease among blacks was impossible, 
particularly because in its latent stage the symptoms of syph- 
ilis become quiescent. As Dr. Thomas W. Murrell wrote: 
They come for treatment  at the beginning and at the end. 
When there are visible manifestations  or when harried by 
pain, they readily come, for as a race they are not averse to 
physic;  but tell them not, though  they look well and feel well, 
that they are still diseased. Here ignorance rates science a 
fool...  14 
Even the best educated black, according to  Murrell, could 
not be convinced to seek treatment for syphilis.15  Venereal 
disease, according to some doctors, threatened the future of 
the race. The medical profession attributed  the low birth rate 
among blacks to  the  high prevalence  of  venereal  disease 
which  caused  stillbirths and  miscarriages. Moreover,  the 
high rates of syphilis were thought to lead to increased in- 
sanity and crime. One doctor writing at the turn of the cen- 
tury estimated that the number of insane Negroes had in- 
creased thirteen-fold since the end of the Civil War.'1 Dr. 
Murrell's conclusion  echoed  the most informed anthropo- 
logical and ethnological data: 
So the scourge sweeps among them. Those that are treated 
are only half cured, and the effort to assimilate  a complex 
civilization  driving  their diseased minds until the results are 
criminal  records.  Perhaps  here, in conjunction  with tubercu- 
losis, will be the end of the negro problem.  Disease will ac- 
complish what man cannot do.17 
This particular configuration of ideas formed the core of 
medical opinion concerning blacks, sex,  and disease in the 
early twentieth century. Doctors generally discounted socio- 
economic explanations of the state of black health, arguing 
that better medical  care could  not  alter the  evolutionary 
scheme.'8 These  assumptions provide the backdrop for ex- 
amining the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. 
The Origins of the Experiment 
In 1929, under a grant from the Julius Rosenwald Fund, 
the USPHS conducted studies in the rural South to determine 
the  prevalence  of  syphilis  among blacks  and  explore  the 
possibilities for mass treatment. The USPHS found Macon 
County, Alabama, in which the town of Tuskegee is located, 
to have the highest syphilis rate of the six counties surveyed. 
The Rosenwald Study concluded that mass treatment could 
be successfully implemented among rural blacks.19  Although 
it is doubtful that the necessary funds would have been allo- 
cated even in the best economic conditions, after the econ- 
omy collapsed in 1929, the findings were ignored. It is, how- 
ever, ironic that the Tuskegee Study came to be based on 
findings of the Rosenwald Study that demonstrated the pos- 
sibilities of mass treatment. 
Three years later, in 1932, Dr. Taliaferro Clark, Chief of 
the  USPHS  Venereal  Disease  Division  and  author of  the 
Rosenwald Study report, decided that conditions in Macon 
County merited renewed attention. Clark believed the high 
prevalence of syphilis offered an "unusual opportunity" for 
observation. From its inception,  the USPHS  regarded the 
Tuskegee Study as a classic "study in nature,"* rather than 
an experiment.20  As long as syphilis was so prevalent in Ma- 
con and most of the blacks went untreated throughout life, 
it seemed only natural to Clark that it would be valuable to 
observe the consequences. He described it as a "ready-made 
situation."21  Surgeon General H. S. Cumming wrote to R. R. 
Moton, Director of the Tuskegee Institute: 
The recent syphilis  control demonstration  carried  out in Ma- 
con County,  with the financial  assistance  of the Julius  Rosen- 
wald Fund, revealed the presence of an unusually  high rate 
in this county and, what is more remarkable,  the fact that 99 
per cent of this group was entirely without previous treat- 
ment. This combination,  together  with the expected  coopera- 
tion of your hospital, offers an unparalleled  opportunity  for 
carrying  on this piece of scientific research  which probably 
cannot be duplicated  anywhere  else in the world.22 
Although no formal protocol appears to have been writ- 
ten, several letters of Clark and Cumming suggest what the 
USPHS hoped to find. Clark indicated that it would be im- 
portant to see how disease affected the daily lives of the men: 
The results  of these studies  of case records  suggest  the desira- 
bility of making a further study of the effect of untreated 
syphilis  on the human  economy among  people now living and 
engaged in their daily pursuits.23 
It also seems that the USPHS believed the experiment might 
demonstrate that antisyphilitic treatment was  unnecessary. 
As Cumming noted:  "It is expected the results of this study 
may have a marked bearing on the treatment, or conversely 
the non-necessity of treatment, of cases of latent syphilis."24 
The immediate source of Cumming's hypothesis appears 
to have been the famous Oslo Study of untreated syphilis. Be- 
tween 1890  and 1910,  Professor C. Boeck, the chief of the 
*In 1865, Claude  Bernard,  the famous  French  physiologist,  out- 
lined  the distinction  between  a "study  in nature"  and  experimentation. 
A study  in nature  required  simple  observation,  an essentially  passive 
act, while  experimentation  demanded  intervention  which  altered  the 
original  condition.  The Tuskegee  Study  was thus  clearly  not a study 
in nature.  The very act of diagnosis  altered  the original  conditions. 
"It  is on this  very  possibility  of acting  or not acting  on a body,"  wrote 
Bernard,  "that  the distinction  will exclusively  rest between  sciences 
callscincf  n  ens  alled  sciences  of observation  and  sciences  called  experimental." 
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22 Oslo Venereal Clinic, withheld treatment from almost two 
thousand patients infected with syphilis. He was convinced 
that therapies then available, primarily mercurial ointment, 
were of no value. When arsenic therapy became widely avail- 
able by 1910, after Paul Ehrlich's historic discovery of "606," 
the study was abandoned. E. Bruusgaard, Boeck's successor, 
conducted a follow-up study of 473 of the untreated patients 
from 1925 to 1927. He found that 27.9 percent of these pa- 
tients had undergone a "spontaneous cure," and now mani- 
fested no symptoms of the disease. Moreover, he estimated 
that as many as 70 percent of all syphilitics went through life 
without inconvenience from the disease.25 His  study, how- 
ever, clearly acknowledged the dangers of untreated syphilis 
for the remaining 30 percent. 
Thus every major textbook of syphilis at the time of the 
Tuskegee  Study's  inception  strongly  advocated  treating 
syphilis even in its latent stages, which follow the initial in- 
flammatory reaction. In discussing the Oslo Study, Dr. J. E. 
Moore,  one  of  the  nation's  leading  venereologists  wrote, 
"This summary of  Bruusgaard's study is by no  means in- 
tended  to  suggest  that  syphilis  be  allowed  to  pass  un- 
treated."26  If a complete cure could not be effected, at least 
the most devastating effects of the disease could be avoided. 
Although the standard therapies of the time, arsenical com- 
pounds and bismuth injection, involved certain dangers be- 
cause of their toxicity, the alternatives were much worse. As 
the Oslo Study had shown, untreated syphilis could lead to 
cardiovascular  disease,  insanity,  and  premature  death.27 
Moore wrote in his 1933 textbook: 
Though it imposes  a slight though measurable  risk  of its own, 
treatment  markedly  diminishes  the risk from syphilis. In la- 
tent syphilis, as I shall show, the probability  of progression, 
relapse, or death is reduced from a probable  25-30 percent 
without treatment  to about 5 percent  with it; and the gravity 
of the relapse if it occurs, is markedly  diminished.28 
"Another compelling reason for treatment," noted Moore, 
"exists in the fact that every patient with latent syphilis may 
be, and perhaps is, infectious for others."29  In 1932, the year 
in which the Tuskegee Study began, the USPHS sponsored 
and published a paper by Moore and six other syphilis ex- 
perts that strongly argued for treating latent syphilis.30 
The Oslo Study, therefore, could not have provided justi- 
fication for the USPHS to undertake a  study that did not 
entail treatment. Rather, the suppositions that conditions in 
Tuskegee existed "naturally"  and that the men would not be 
treated anyway provided the experiment's rationale. In turn, 
these two assumptions rested on the prevailing medical atti- 
tudes  concerning  blacks,  sex,  and  disease.  For  example, 
Clark explained the prevalence of venereal disease in Macon 
County by emphasizing promiscuity among blacks: 
This state  of affairs  is due to the paucity  of doctors,  rather  low 
intelligence  of the Negro population  in this section, depressed 
economic conditions, and the very common promiscuous  sex 
relations  of this population  group which not only contribute 
to the spread  of syphilis but also contribute  to the prevailing 
indifference  with regard  to treatment.31 
In fact, Moore, who had written so persuasively in favor 
of treating latent syphilis, suggested that existing knowledge 
did not apply to Negroes. Although he had called the Oslo 
Study  "a  never-to-be-repeated  human  experiment,"32 he 
served as an expert consultant to the Tuskegee Study: 
I think that such a study as you have contemplated  would be 
of immense  value. It will be necessary  of course in the con- 
sideration  of the results  to evaluate the special factors intro- 
duced by a selection of the material  from negro males. Syph- 
ilis in the negro is in many respects  almost a different  disease 
from syphilis  in the white.33 
Dr. O. C. Wenger, chief of the federally operated venereal 
disease  clinic  at Hot  Springs, Arkansas,  praised  Moore's 
judgment, adding, "This study will emphasize those  differ- 
ences."34  On another occasion he advised Clark, "We must 
remember we are dealing with a group of people who  are 
illiterate, have no conception of time, and whose  personal 
history is always indefinite."35 
The doctors who devised and directed the Tuskegee Study 
accepted the mainstream assumptions regarding blacks and 
venereal disease. The premise that blacks, promiscuous and 
lustful, would not seek or continue  treatment, shaped the 
study. A test of untreated syphilis seemed "natural"  because 
the USPHS presumed the men would never be treated; the 
Tuskegee Study made that a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Selecting the Subjects 
Clark sent Dr. Raymond Vonderlehr to Tuskegee in Sep- 
tember 1932 to assemble a sample of men with latent syph- 
ilis for the experiment. The basic design of the study called 
for the selection of syphilitic black males between the ages 
of  twenty-five and sixty,  a thorough physical examination 
including x-rays, and finally, a spinal tap to determine the 
incidence of neuro-syphilis.3(;  They had no intention of pro- 
viding any treatment for the  infected  men.:7 The  USPHS 
originally scheduled the whole experiment to last six months; 
it seemed to be both a simple and inexpensive project. 
The task of collecting the sample, however, proved to be 
more difficult than the USPHS  had supposed.  Vonderlehr 
canvassed the largely illiterate, poverty-stricken population 
of sharecroppers and tenant farmers in search of test sub- 
jects. If his circulars requested only men over twenty-five to 
attend his  clinics,  none  would  appear, suspecting he  was 
conducting draft physicals. Therefore, he was forced to test 
large numbers of women and men who did not fit the experi- 
ment's  specifications.  This  involved  considerable  expense 
since the USPHS had promised the Macon County Board of 
Health that it would treat those who were infected, but not 
included in the study.38  Clark wrote to Vonderlehr about the 
situation:  "It never once occured to me that we would be 
called upon to treat a large part of the county as return for 
the privilege of making this study....  I am anxious to keep 
the expenditures for treatment down to the lowest possible 
point because it is the one item of expenditure in connection 
with the study most difficult to  defend despite our knowl- 
edge of the need therefor."39  Vonderlehr responded: "If we 
could find from 100 to 200 cases ...  we would not have to 
do another Wassermann on useless individuals ..  ."4 
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I Significantly, the attempt to  develop  the sample contra- 
dicted the prediction the USPHS had made initially regarding 
the prevalence of the disease in Macon County. Overall rates 
of  syphilis fell well  below  expectations; as opposed to the 
USPHS projection of 35 percent, 20 percent of those tested 
were actually diseased.41 Moreover, those who had sought 
and received previous treatment far exceeded the expecta- 
tions of the USPHS. Clark noted in a letter to Vonderlehr: 
I find your report of March 6th quite interesting  but regret 
the necessity  for Wassermanning  [sic] . . . such a large num- 
ber of individuals  in order to uncover this relatively  limited 
number  of untreated  cases.42 
Further difficulties arose in enlisting the subjects to par- 
ticipate in the experiment, to be  "Wassermanned," and to 
return for a subsequent series of examinations. Vonderlehr 
found that only the offer of treatment elicited the coopera- 
tion of the men. They were told they were ill and were prom- 
ised  free care.  Offered therapy, they became  willing  sub- 
jects.43 The  USPHS  did  not  tell  the  men  that  they  were 
participants in an experiment; on the contrary, the subjects 
believed they were being treated for "bad blood"-the  rural 
South's colloquialism for syphilis. They thought they were 
participating in a public health demonstration similar to the 
one that had been conducted by the Julius Rosenwald Fund 
in Tuskegee several years earlier. In the end, the men were 
so  eager for medical care that the number of defaulters in 
the experiment proved to be insignificant.44 
To preserve the subjects' interest, Vonderlehr gave most 
of  the men mercurial ointment, a noneffective drug, while 
some  of  the younger men  apparently received  inadequate 
dosages of neoarsphenamine.45  This required Vonderlehr to 
write frequently to Clark requesting supplies. He feared the 
experiment would fail if the men were not offered treatment. 
It is desirable  and essential  if the study is to be a success to 
maintain  the interest of each of the cases examined by me 
through to the time when the spinal puncture  can be com- 
pleted. Expenditure  of several  hundred  dollars  for drugs  for 
these men would be well worth  while if their interest  and co- 
operation  would be maintained  in so doing....  It is my desire 
to keep the main purpose  of the work from the negroes  in the 
county and continue  their interest  in treatment.  That is what 
the vast majority  wants and the examination  seems relatively 
unimportant  to them in comparison.  It would probably  cause 
the entire experiment  to collapse if the clinics were stopped 
before the work is completed.46 
On another occasion he explained: 
Dozens of patients have been sent away without treatment 
during  the past two weeks and it would have been impossible 
to continue  without the free distribution  of drugs because of 
the unfavorable  impression  made on the negro.47 
The  readiness of  the test subjects to  participate of  course 
contradicted the notion that blacks would not seek or con- 
tinue therapy. 
The final procedure of the experiment was to be a spinal 
tap to test for evidence of neuro-syphilis. The USPHS pre- 
sented this purely diagnostic exam, which often entails con- 
siderable pain and complications, to the men as a "special 
treatment." Clark explained to Moore: 
We have not yet commenced  the spinal  punctures.  This oper- 
ation  will be deferred  to the last in order  not to unduly  disturb 
our field work by any adverse reports by the patients sub- 
jected to spinal  puncture  because  of some disagreeable  sensa- 
tions following this procedure.  These negroes are very igno- 
rant and easily influenced  by things that would be of minor 
significance  in a more intelligent  group.48 
The letter to the subjects announcing the spinal tap read: 
Some time ago you were given a thorough examination  and 
since that time we hope you have gotten a great deal of treat- 
ment for bad blood. You will now be given your last chance 
to get a second examination.  This examination  is a very spe- 
cial one and after it is finished you will be given a special 
treatment  if it is believed  you are in a condition  to stand  it.... 
REMEMBER  THIS IS  YOUR LAST CHANCE  FOR SPECIAL 
FREE  TREATMENT.  BE  SURE  TO  MEET  THE  NURSE.49 
The HEW investigation did not uncover this crucial fact: the 
men participated in the study under the guise of treatment. 
Despite  the fact that their assumption regarding preva- 
lence  and  black  attitudes  toward  treatment  had  proved 
wrong, the USPHS decided in the summer of  1933 to con- 
tinue the study. Once again, it seemed only "natural"  to pur- 
sue the research since the sample already existed, and with 
a depressed economy,  the cost of treatment appeared pro- 
hibitive-although  there is no indication it was ever consid- 
ered. Vonderlehr first suggested extending the study in letters 
to Clark and Wenger: 
At the end of this project  we shall have a considerable  num- 
ber of cases presenting  various  complications  of syphilis,  who 
have received only mercury and may still be considered  un- 
treated  in the modern  sense of therapy.  Should these cases be 
followed over a period of from five to ten years many inter- 
esting facts could be learned regarding  the course and com- 
plications  of untreated  syphilis.50 
"As I see it," responded Wenger, "we have no further inter- 
est in these patients until they die."51  Apparently, the physi- 
cians engaged in the experiment believed that only autopsies 
could scientifically confirm the findings of the study. Surgeon 
General Cumming explained this in a letter to R. R. Moton, 
requesting the continued cooperation of the Tuskegee Insti- 
tute Hospital: 
This study which was predominantly  clinical in character 
points to the frequent  occurrence  of severe complications  in- 
volving the various  vital organs  of the body and indicates  that 
syphilis as a disease does a great deal of damage. Since clin- 
ical observations are not  considered final in  the medical 
world, it is our desire to continue observation  on the cases 
selected for the recent study and if possible to bring a per- 
centage of these cases to autopsy so that pathological con- 
firmation  may be made of the disease processes.52 
Bringing the men to autopsy required the USPHS to de- 
vise a further series of deceptions and inducements. Wenger 
warned Vonderlehr that the men must not realize that they 
would be autopsied: 
Hastings Center Report, December 1978  24 There  is one danger  in the latter  plan and that is if the colored 
population become aware that accepting free hospital care 
means a post-mortem,  every darkey  will leave Macon County 
and it will hurt [Dr. Eugene]  Dibble's hospital.'53 
"Naturally," responded Vonderlehr, "it is not my intention 
to let it be generally known that the main object of the pres- 
ent activities is the bringing of the men to necropsy."54  The 
subjects' trust in  the  USPHS  made  the  plan  viable.  The 
USPHS gave Dr. Dibble, the Director of the Tuskegee Insti- 
tute Hospital, an interim appointment to the Public Health 
Service. As Wenger noted: 
One thing is certain.  The only way we are going to get post- 
mortems  is to have the demise take place in Dibble's  hospital 
and when these colored folks are told that Doctor Dibble is 
now a Government  doctor too they will have more confi- 
dence.55* 
After the USPHS  approved the  continuation of the  ex- 
periment in 1933, Vonderlehr decided that it would be nec- 
essary to select a group of healthy, uninfected men to serve 
as controls. Vonderlehr, who had succeeded Clark as Chief 
of the Venereal Disease  Division,  sent Dr. J. R.  Heller to 
Tuskegee  to  gather the  control  group.  Heller  distributed 
drugs (noneffective)  to these men, which suggests that they 
also  believed  they  were  undergoing  treatment.5;'  Control 
subjects who  became  syphilitic were simply transferred to 
the test group-a  strikingly inept violation of standard re- 
search procedure.57 
The USPHS offered several inducements to maintain con- 
tact and to procure the continued cooperation of the men. 
Eunice Rivers, a black nurse, was hired to follow their health 
and to secure approval for autopsies. She gave the men non- 
effective medicines-"spring  tonic" and aspirin-as  well as 
transportation and hot meals on the days of their examina- 
tions.58 More important, Nurse Rivers provided continuity 
to the project over the entire forty-year period. By supplying 
"medicinals," the USPHS was able to continue to deceive the 
participants, who believed that they were receiving therapy 
from  the  government doctors.  Deceit  was  integral to  the 
study. When the test subjects complained about spinal taps 
one doctor wrote: 
*The  degree  of black  cooperation  in conducting  the study  remains 
unclear  and  would  be impossible  to properly  assess  in an  article  of this 
length.  It seems  certain  that  some  members  of the Tuskegee  Institute 
staff  such  as R. R. Moton  and  Eugene  Dibble  understood  the nature 
of the experiment  and gave their support  to it. There  is, however, 
evidence  that  some blacks  who assisted  the USPHS  physicians  were 
not aware  of the deceptive  nature  of the experiment.  Dr. Joshua 
Williams,  an intern at the John A.  Andrew Memorial  Hospital 
(Tuskegee  Institute)  in 1932, assisted  Vonderlehr  in taking  blood 
samples  of the test  subjects.  In 1973  he told  the  HEW  panel:  "I  know 
we thought  it was  merely  a service  group  organized  to help  the  people 
in the  area.  We  didn't  know  it was  a research  project  at all  at the  time." 
(See, "Transcript  of Proceedings,"  Tuskegee  Syphilis  Study  Ad Hoc 
Advisory  Panel,  February  23, 1973,  Unpublished  typescript.  National 
Library  of Medicine,  Bethesda,  Maryland.)  It is also apparent  that 
Eunice  Rivers,  the black  nurse  who had primary  responsibility  for 
maintaining  contact  with  the men  over  the forty  years,  did not fully 
understand  the  dangers  of the  experiment.  In any  event,  black  involve- 
ment  in the study  in no way mitigates  the racial  assumptions  of the 
experiment,  but  rather,  demonstrates  their  power. 
They simply  do not like spinal  punctures.  A few of those who 
were tapped  are enthusiastic  over the results  but to most, the 
suggestion causes violent shaking of the head; others claim 
they were robbed of their procreative  powers (regardless  of 
the fact that I claim it stimulates  them).59 
Letters to  the  subjects announcing  an impending USPHS 
visit to Tuskegee explained:  "[The doctor]  wants to make 
a special examination to find out how you have been feeling 
and whether the treatment has improved your health."60  In 
fact, after the first six months of the study, the USPHS had 
furnished no treatment whatsoever. 
Finally, because it proved difficult to persuade the men to 
come  to  the  hospital  when  they  became  severely  ill,  the 
USPHS promised to cover their burial expenses.  The Mil- 
bank Memorial Fund provided approximately $50 per man 
for this purpose beginning in 1935.  This was a particularly 
strong inducement as funeral rites constituted an important 
component of the cultural life of rural blacks.61 One report 
of the study concluded, "Without this suasion it would, we 
believe, have been impossible to  secure the cooperation of 
the group and their families."62 
Reports of the study's findings, which appeared regularly 
in the medical press beginning in 1936, consistently cited the 
ravages of  untreated syphilis. The  first paper,  read at the 
1936 American Medical Association  annual meeting, found 
"that syphilis in this period [latency] tends to greatly increase 
the frequency of manifestations of cardiovascular disease."63 
Only  16 percent of  the subjects gave no sign of  morbidity 
as opposed to 61 percent of the controls. Ten years later, a 
report noted coldly, "The fact that nearly twice as large a 
proportion of  the  syphilitic  individuals  as  of  the  control 
group has died is a very striking one." Life expectancy, con- 
cluded the doctors, is reduced by about 20 percent.64 
A  1955  article found that slightly more than 30 percent 
of the test group autopsied had died directly from advanced 
syphilitic lesions of either the cardiovascular or the central 
nervous system.65 Another published account stated, "Re- 
view of those still living reveals that an appreciable number 
have late complications of syphilis which probably will re- 
sult, for some at least, in contributing materially to the ulti- 
mate cause of death.""6  In 1950, Dr. Wenger had concluded, 
"We now know, where we could only surmise before, that we 
have  contributed  to  their  ailments  and  shortened  their 
lives."67  As black physician Vernal Cave, a member of the 
HEW panel, later wrote, "They proved a point, then proved 
a point, then proved a point."68 
During the forty years of the experiment the USPHS had 
sought on several occasions to ensure that the subjects did 
not receive treatment from other sources. To this end, Von- 
derlehr met with groups of local black doctors in 1934,  to 
ask their cooperation in not treating the men. Lists of  sub- 
jects  were  distributed to  Macon  County  physicians  along 
with letters requesting them to refer these men back to the 
USPHS if they sought care.69  The USPHS warned the Ala- 
bama Health Department not to treat the test subjects when 
they  took  a  mobile  VD  unit  into  Tuskegee  in  the  early 
1940s.T0 In 1941, the Army drafted several subjects and told 
them  to  begin  antisyphilitic  treatment  immediately.  The 
The Hastings  Center  25 USPHS supplied the draft board with a list of  256  names 
they desired to have excluded from treatment, and the board 
complied.7" 
In spite of these efforts, by the early 1950s  many of the 
men had secured some  treatment on their own.  By  1952, 
almost 30  percent of  the  test  subjects had received some 
penicillin, although only 7.5 percent had received what could 
be considered adequate doses.72  Vonderlehr wrote to one of 
the participating physicians, "I hope that the availability of 
antibiotics has not interfered too much with this project."73 
A  report published in  1955  considered whether the treat- 
ment that some of the men had obtained had "defeated" the 
study. The article attempted to explain the relatively low ex- 
posure to penicillin in an age of antibiotics, suggesting as a 
reason: "the stoicism of these men as a group; they still re- 
gard hospitals and medicines with suspicion and prefer an 
occasional dose of time-honored herbs or tonics to modern 
drugs."74  The authors failed to  note that the men believed 
they already were under the care of the government doctors 
and thus  saw  no  need  to  seek  treatment elsewhere.  Any 
treatment which  the men might have  received, concluded 
the report, had been insufficient to compromise the experi- 
ment. 
When the USPHS evaluated the status of the study in the 
1960s they continued to rationalize the racial aspects of the 
experiment. For example, the minutes of a 1965 meeting at 
the Center for Disease Control recorded: 
Racial issue was mentioned  briefly.  Will not affect the study. 
Any questions  can be handled  by saying  these people were at 
the point that therapy  would no longer help them. They are 
getting better medical  care than they would under any other 
circumstances.75 
A group of physicians met again at the CDC in 1969 to de- 
Claude Bernard on Human Experimentation (1865) 
Experiments,  then, may be performed  on man, but within 
what limits? It is our duty and our right to perform an 
experiment  on man whenever  it can save his life, cure him 
or gain him some personal  benefit.  The principle  of med- 
ical and surgical morality, therefore, consists in  never 
performing  on man an experiment  which might be harm- 
ful to him to any extent, even though the result might be 
highly advantageous  to science,  i.e., to the health  of others. 
But performing experiments and operations exclusively 
from the point of view of the patient's  own advantage  does 
not prevent  their turning  out profitably  to science. ...  For 
we must not deceive ourselves,  morals  do not forbid mak- 
ing experiments  on one's neighbor  or on one's self. Chris- 
tian morals  forbid only one thing, doing ill to one's neigh- 
bor. So, among  the experiments  that may be tried on man, 
those that can only harm are forbidden, those that are 
innocent are permissible,  and those that may do good are 
obligatory.  Claude  Bernard,  An Introduction  to the Study 
of  Experimental  Medicine (1865).  Trans. by Henry C. 
Green (New York:  Dover Publications,  1957). 
cide whether or not to terminate the  study. Although  one 
doctor argued that the study should be stopped and the men 
treated, the consensus was to continue. Dr. J. Lawton Smith 
remarked, "You will never have another study like this; take 
advantage of it."7T  A memo prepared by Dr. James B. Lucas, 
Assistant  Chief  of  the  Venereal  Disease  Branch,  stated: 
"Nothing learned will prevent, find, or cure a single case of 
infectious syphilis or bring us closer to our basic mission of 
controlling venereal disease in the United States."77  He con- 
cluded, however, that the study should be continued "along 
its present lines." When the first accounts of the experiment 
appeared in the national press in July 1972,  data were still 
being collected and autopsies performed.78 
The HEW Final Report 
HEW finally formed the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc 
Advisory Panel on August 28,  1972, in response to criticism 
that the press descriptions of the experiment had triggered. 
The panel, composed of nine members, five of them black, 
concentrated on two issues. First, was the study justified in 
1932 and had the men given their informed consent? Second, 
should penicillin have been provided when it became avail- 
able in the early  1950s?  The panel was also charged with 
determining if the study should be terminated and assessing 
current policies regarding experimentation with human sub- 
jects.79  The group issued their report in June 1973. 
By  focusing  on  the  issues of  penicillin therapy and in- 
formed consent, the Final Report and the investigation be- 
trayed a basic misunderstanding  of the experiment's purposes 
and design. The HEW report implied that the failure to pro- 
vide penicillin constituted the study's major ethical misjudg- 
ment; implicit was the assumption that no adequate therapy 
existed prior to penicillin. Nonetheless  medical  authorities 
From the HEW Final Report (1973) 
1. In retrospect, the Public Health Service Study of 
Untreated  Syphilis in the Male Negro in Macon County, 
Alabama, was ethically unjustified  in  1932. This judge- 
ment made in 1973 about  the conduct of the study  in 1932 
is made with the advantage  of hindsight  acutely  sharpened 
over some forty years, concerning  an activity  in a different 
age with different  social standards.  Nevertheless,  one fun- 
damental  ethical rule is that a person should not be sub- 
jected to avoidable  risk of death or physical harm unless 
he freely and intelligently  consents. There is no evidence 
that such consent was obtained from the participants  in 
this study. 
2.  Because of the paucity of information  available  to- 
day on the manner  in which the study was conceived, de- 
signed and sustained, a scientific justification  for a short 
term demonstration  study cannot be ruled out. However, 
the conduct of the longitudinal  study as initially reported 
in 1936 and through  the years is judged  to be scientifically 
unsound and its  results are  disproportionately  meager 
compared  with known  risks  to human  subjects  involved.... 
Hastings  Center  Report,  December  1978  26 firmly believed in the efficacy of arsenotherapy for treating 
syphilis at the time of the experiment's inception in  1932. 
The panel  further failed to  recognize that the entire study 
had been predicated on nontreatment. Provision of effective 
medication would have violated the rationale of the experi- 
ment-to  study the natural course of the disease until death. 
On several occasions, in fact, the USPHS had prevented the 
men from receiving proper treatment. Indeed, there is no evi- 
dence that the USPHS ever considered providing penicillin. 
The other focus of the Final Report-informed  consent- 
also served to obscure the historical facts of the experiment. 
In light of the deceptions and exploitations which the experi- 
ment perpetrated, it is an understatement to declare, as the 
Report did, that the experiment was "ethically unjustified," 
because it failed to obtain informed consent from the sub- 
jects. The Final Report's statement, "Submitting  voluntarily 
is not informed consent," indicated that the panel believed 
that the men had volunteered for the experiment.80  The rec- 
ords in the National Archives make clear that the men did 
not submit voluntarily to an experiment; they were told and 
they  believed  that  they  were  getting free  treatment from 
expert government doctors for a serious disease. The failure 
of the HEW Final Report to expose this critical fact-that 
the  USPHS  lied  to  the  subjects-calls  into  question  the 
thoroughness and credibility of their investigation. 
Failure to place the study in a historical context also made 
it impossible for the investigation to deal with the essentially 
racist nature of the experiment. The panel treated the study 
as an aberration, well-intentioned but misguided.81 More- 
over, concern that the Final Report might be viewed as a 
critique of human experimentation in general seems to have 
severely limited the scope of the inquiry. The Final Report 
is quick to remind the reader on two occasions:  "The posi- 
tion of the Panel must not be construed to be a general re- 
pudiation of scientific research with human subjects."82  The 
Report assures us that a better designed experiment could 
have been justified: 
It is possible  that a scientific  study  in 1932 of untreated  syph- 
ilis, properly  conceived with a clear protocol and conducted 
with suitable subjects  who fully understood  the implications 
of their involvement, might have been justified in the pre- 
penicillin era. This is especially  true when one considers  the 
uncertain nature of  the results of  treatment of  late latent 
syphilis  and the highly  toxic nature  of therapeutic  agents  then 
available.83 
This statement is questionable in view of the proven dangers 
of untreated syphilis known in 1932. 
Since the publication of the HEW Final Report, a defense 
of the Tuskegee Study has emerged. These arguments, most 
clearly articulated by Dr. R. H. Kampmeier in the Southern 
Medical Journal, center on the limited knowledge of effec- 
tive therapy for latent syphilis when the experiment began. 
Kampmeier argues that by 1950, penicillin would have been 
of no value for these men.84  Others have suggested that the 
men were fortunate to  have been  spared the  highly toxic 
treatments of  the  earlier  period.85 Moreover,  even  these 
contemporary defenses  assume that the  men  never would 
have been treated anyway. As Dr. Charles Barnett of Stan- 
ford University wrote in 1974,  "The lack of treatment was 
not contrived by the USPHS but was an established fact of 
which they proposed to take advantage."86  Several doctors 
who participated in the study continued to justify the experi- 
ment. Dr. J. R. Heller, who on one occasion had referred to 
the test subjects as the "Ethiopian population," told reporters 
in 1972: 
I don't see why they should be shocked or horrified.  There 
was no racial side to this. It just happened  to be in a black 
community.  I feel this was a perfectly straightforward  study, 
perfectly ethical, with controls.  Part of our mission as physi- 
cians is to find out what happens  to individuals  with disease 
and without disease.87 
These apologies, as well as the HEW Final Report, ignore 
many of the essential ethical issues which the study poses, 
The Tuskegee Study reveals the persistence of beliefs within 
the medical profession about the nature of blacks, sex, and 
disease-beliefs  that had tragic repercussions long after their 
alleged "scientific" bases were known to be incorrect. Most 
strikingly, the entire health of a community was jeopardized 
by leaving a communicable disease untreated.88  There can be 
little  doubt  that  the  Tuskegee  researchers regarded their 
subjects as less than human.89  As a result, the ethical canons 
of experimenting on human subjects were completely disre- 
garded. 
The study also raises significant questions  about profes- 
sional  self-regulation and scientific bureaucracy. Once the 
USPHS decided to extend the experiment in the summer of 
1933,  it was unlikely that the test would be halted short of 
the men's deaths. The experiment was widely reported for 
forty years without evoking any significant protest within the 
medical community. Nor  did any bureaucratic mechanism 
exist within the government for the periodic reassessment of 
the Tuskegee experiment's ethics and scientific value. The 
USPHS sent physicians to Tuskegee every several years to 
check on the study's progress, but never subjected the moral- 
ity or usefulness of the experiment to serious scrutiny. Only 
the press accounts of  1972 finally punctured the continued 
rationalizations of the USPHS and brought the study to an 
end. Even the HEW investigation was compromised by fear 
that it would be considered a threat to future human experi- 
mentation. 
In retrospect the Tuskegee Study revealed more about the 
pathology of racism than it did about the pathology of syph- 
ilis; more about the nature of scientific inquiry than the na- 
ture of the disease process. The injustice committed by the 
experiment went well beyond the facts outlined in the press 
and the HEW Final Report. The  degree of deception  and 
damages have been seriously underestimated. As this history 
of the study suggests, the notion that science is a value-free 
discipline must be rejected. The need for greater vigilance in 
assessing the specific ways in which sooial values and atti- 
tudes affect professional behavior is clearly indicated. 
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